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THE BULK SALES LAW IN WASHINGTON
The recent case of Hull v. Minkler' clarifies certain aspects and pre-
sents some new problems concerning Washington's Bulk Sales Law.2
The purpose of this comment is to discuss the general application of
the statute as well as the principles set forth in the Minkler case.
LEGISLATIVE BACKGROUND
Since the enactment of the original Bulk Sales Law in 1901, no less
than five amendments3 have been passed by the legislature that in some
measure modify the law. However, the general purpose of the statute,
to prevent the defrauding of creditors by secret sale in bulk of all or
substantially all of a vendor's stock of goods and fixtures' has never
been materially altered. To achieve this desired purpose, the basic re-
quirement of the statute is that the vendee of a sale in bulk must
obtain from the vendor a list of the vendor's creditors, and see to it
that the purchase price is applied pro rata to the payment of those
creditors.
At the present time all fifty states have some form of the Bulk Sales
Law,5 all of which have the same general purpose. The various state
laws are not uniform, however. To understand more fully the present
status of the law in Washington, reference will occasionally be made
to decisions of other states having similar statutes, as well as to
Washington cases and statutes.
The object of the first amendment, in 1913, 6 to the Washington Bulk
Sales Law was to include the sale of "fixtures." In 1925 at the special
session of the Washington Legislature, the entire act was polished and
changed into substantially the form of the present law,' except for the
following amendments: (1) In 1939, the legislature extended the act
beyond solely mercantile businesses to include "any restaurant, cafe,
151 Wn.2d 508, 319 P.2d 815 (1958).
2 RCW 63.08.010 -. 060.
3 Wash. Sess. Laws 1913, c. 174; Wash. Sess. Laws, Fx. Sess. 1925, c. 135; Wash.
Sess. Laws 1939, c. 122; Wash. Sess. Laws 1943, c. 98; Wash. Sess. Laws 1953, c. 247.
4 Hull v. Minkler, 51 Wn.2d 508, 319 P.2d 815 (1958) ; Blanchard Co. v. Ward, 124
Wash. 204, 213 Pac. 929 (1923) ; McAvoy v. Jennings, 44 Wash. 79, 87 Pac. 53 (1906) ;
McDaniels v. J. J. Connelly Shoe Co., 30 Wash. 549, 78 Pac. 37 (1902). See also: Mill
& Logging Supply Co. v. West Tenino Lumber Co., 44 Wn.2d 102, 265 P.2d 807 (1954).
5 NEW YORK STATE LAW REVisioN COMMISSIoN-STuDY OF UNIFORM COMMERCIAL,
CODE, ARTICLE 6-BULK TRANSFERS (Leg. Doc. No. 65 (G) 1955).6 Wash. Sess. Laws 1913, c. 174.
7 Wash. Sess. Laws, Ex. Sess. 1925, c. 135 (now codified, with three subsequent
amendments, in RCW 63.08.010-.060). See also Driscoll, The "Sales in Bulk" Act,
4 W.sx. L. REv. 97 (1929).
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beer parlor, tavern, hotel, club or gasoline station."8 This amendment
also added two requirements to be stated in the vendor's affidavit of
creditors: Amounts owing to employees, and the consideration to be
paid by the vendee.' (2) The 1943 amendment'0 modified the wording
of the statute slightly, one objective being to clarify the meaning of
the act as amended in 1939. The major substantive effect of this
amendment was to include protection of those creditors who rendered
services to the vendor. (3) The most recent amendment, in 1953,"
added the requirement of listing unpaid taxes on the sworn statement
of the vendor 2 and a statement that all taxes have been paid, or if
unpaid, that the amount in the statement is the correct amount due
and owing to the best of the vendor's knowledge. 3 The statement also
must now be made in triplicate instead of duplicate, with the addi-
tional copy going to the office of the state tax commission.'4 The new-
est amendment also provides that the purchase price will first be
applied to payment of taxes.'5
PURPOSE OF THE BULK SALES LAW
The prevention of secret and fraudulent sales in bulk by the vendor
to the detriment of his creditors is the purpose of Washington's Bulk
Sales Law.'" There is a penal section" to the statute which declares
8 Wash. Sess. Laws 1939, c. 122.
9 RCW 63.08.020 contains these requirements as provided by Wash. Sess. Laws 1939,
c. 122. See also Washington Legislation, 14 WASH L. REV. 197 (1939).
10 Wash. Sess. Laws 1943, c. 98.
11 Wash. Sess. Laws 1953, c. 247.
12 RCW 63.08.020.
13 RCW 63.08.030 shows a form of the statement that must be obtained. RCW
63.08.020 provides that the statement of creditors must be sworn to "substantially" as
provided for in RCW 63.08.030.
'4 RCW 63.08.040 provides: "The verified statement shall be made and executed in
triplicate and delivered to the vendee who shall cause one of such statements to be filed
in the office of the county auditor of the county in which the stock or fixtures proposed
to be purchased are situated and served upon the office of the state tax commission, by
mail or otherwise, at least seven days before the consummation of the purchase, and it
shall be indexed as chattel mortgages are indexed, the name of the vendor being in-
dexed as mortgagor and the name of the intending purchaser as mortgagee."
It should be noted that there is no requirement in the Washington statute for direct
notice to the creditors. All that is necessary is that the above statute is followed; this
is deemed to be constructive notice to such creditors. Some other states have a require-
ment for personal service of notice upon the creditors instead of merely filing with the
county auditor. See VOLD, SALES § 81 (2d ed. 1959).
15 RCW 63.08.050.
16 Plass v. Morgan, 36 Wash. 160, 78 Pac. 784 (1904) ; see cases cited note 4 supra.
'7 RCW 63.08.060 provides: "Any vendor of all or substantially all of any stock of
goods, wares or merchandise, of any restaurant, cafe, beer parlor, tavern, hotel, club or
gasoline service station, and/or all or substantially all of the fixtures and equipment
used in and about the business of the vendor, sold or transferred in bulk, or any other
person who is acting for or in behalf of such vendor, who shall knowingly or wilfully
make or deliver, or cause to be made or delivered, a statement as provided for in RCW
63.08.020 through 63.08.040, which shall not include the names of all of the creditors of
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the vendor guilty of perjury if he knowingly or wilfully delivers to
the vendee a false or incomplete statement of creditors. The statute
as a whole is a restriction of the common law right to alienate prop-
erty, but the constitutionality of the Bulk Sales Law has been upheld
in Washington as a proper exercise of state police power."8 Similar
statutes have been upheld in other jurisdictions, on various grounds. 9
There is a conflict of opinion as to whether a bulk sales statute should
be liberally or strictly construed, 0 but it appears that it is afforded
strict construction by the Washington court.2
SALE, EXCHANGE, OR TRANSFER
The statute includes as a sale in bulk "Any sale, exchange, or trans-
fer... "" of all or substantially all of the vendor's goods or fixtures.
Although there appeared some confusion in early Washington cases
whether the Bulk Sales Law applied to transfers for other than cash
or credit," the recent case of Hull v. Minkler4 held that a transfer,
even without consideration, is within the purview of the statute. The
court there defined "sale" as a passage of property for a price or con-
sideration," "exchange" as any transfer of goods for other goods or
such vendor, of the character specified in RCW 63.08.020 through 63.08.040, together
with their addresses, and the correct amounts due, and to become due each of them
respectively, or which shall contain any false statement, shall be deemed guilty of
perjury."
See State v. Epstein, 138 Wash. 118, 244 Pac. 338 (1926) (list of vendor's creditors
may be defective unless sworn to before a notary) ; Thompson v. Nakamura, 128 Wash.
637, 223 Pac. 1055 (1924) (affidavit will not be insufficient because of mere trivial
errors; omitting comma and word "or" held too trivial).
Is McDaniels v. J. J. Connelly Shoe Co., 30 Wash. 549, 71 Pac. 37 (1902).
9 E.g., McLean v. Miller Robinson Co., 55 F.2d 232 (E.D. Pa. 1931); Item
Co. v. National Dyers and Cleaners, 15 La. App. 108, 130 So. 879 (1930) ; Miller v.
Myers, 300 Pa. 192, 150 AtI. 588 (1930) (no violation of due process, equal protection
or privileges and immunities prohibitions in the United States Constitution); and
Raleigh Tire & Rubber Co. v. Morris, 181 N.C. 184, 106 S.E. 562 (1921), (proper
exercise of police power). Utah has not expressly held its present statute constitu-
tional. A statute there (prior to an amendment thereto) was held to be unconstitutional
in Block v. Schwart, 27 Utah 387, 76 Pac. 22 (1904), and to this date the constitu-
tionality of the amended statute has not been decided.
20 The tendency in most jurisdictions seems to be toward a more liberal construction
in favor of creditors, but at present there is no clear majority either way. VoLD, SALEs
§ 81 (2d ed. 1959). Section 1.102(1) of the UNrFoam CommEacrAL CODE, adopts a rule
of liberal construction.
21 Thompson v. Nakamura, 128 Wash. 637, 223 Pac. 1055 (1924) ; Blanchard Co. v.
Ward, 124 Wash. 204, 218 Pac. 929 (1923). But see Hull v. Minkler, 51 Wn.2d 508,
319 P.2d 515 (1958) ; and Electrical Prods. Consol. v. Smyser, 19 Wn.2d 509, 143 P.2d
452 (1943), which held the controlling rule, as to the Bulk Sales Act, is that the words
of the statute be given their ordinary and accepted meaning.
22 RCW 63.08.010.
23 Driscoll, The "Sales in Bulk" Act, 4 WASH. L. R-v. 97 (1929).
24 51 Wn.2d 508, 319 P.2d 815 (1958).
2 5 Hull v. Minkler, 51 Wn.2d 508, 319 P.2d 515 (1958). See also North Idaho Grain
Co. v. Callison, 83 Wash. 212, 145 Pac. 232 (1915).
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property,26 and "transfer" as any act that vests property in another,
whether for consideration or otherwise." The court reasoned that had
the legislature intended to include only transfers for value, the words
"sale" and "exchange" would have been sufficient. The court points
out that in the 1925 amendment," the words "attempted sale, ex-
change, or transfer" were included, showing additional evidence that
the legislature intended to include within the statute all bulk transfers
that may perpetrate fraud upon creditors.29 (A more complete dis-
cussion of the Minkler case appears later in this Comment.)
The significance of the word "attempted" in the statutory phrase,
attempted sale, exchange, or transfer"0 is difficult to ascertain. Other
than the court's reliance on the entire phrase in Hull v. Minkler2 ' as
previously indicated, there has been no interpretation or indication by
the court of the impact of this clause. It would seem that an attempted
transfer could not harm the creditor in any way since the title would
remain with the vendor until the transfer was completed.2
Certain transfers are not included within the Bulk Sales Law. For
instance, the statute specifically excludes sales or transfers of prop-
erty by executors, administrators, receivers, or public officers acting
under judicial process."2 Although the Washington court has not been
presented the question, it is generally held that sales at public auc-
tions are not within the purview of the statute.2 " Since "preferential
transfers" are acceptable in Washington under certain circumstances,
the Bulk Sales Law does not apply where the failing debtor transfers
his stock of goods in preference to one of his creditors, if the stock
is of less value than the debt owed to that creditor."3 The statute is
not applicable when the goods purchased from a particular creditor
26 Hull v. Minkler, supra note 25. See also BLACK, LAW DICTIONARY 671 (4th ed.
1951).
27 Hull v. Minkler, supra note 25. See also Gazzam v. Young, 114 Wash. 66, 194
Pac. 810 (1921).
28 Wash. Sess. Laws, Ex. Sess. 1925, c. 135 (Now codified as RCW 63.08.010).
29 Hull v. Minkler, supra note 25. The court was not persuaded by the dicta in
Daniels v. Pacific Brewing & Malting Co., 86 Wash. 416, 150 Pac. 609 (1915), to the
effect that all that was necessary to take a transfer out of the sales in bulk act was that
no purchase money should pass.
30 RCW 63.08.010, which includes in the definition of bulk sale "Any sale, exchange
or transfer, or attempted sale, exchange or transfer. .. " [Emphasis added].
21 Supra note 24.
82 Driscoll, supra note 23, at 105, 106.
22 RCW 63.08.010 states: "Provided, That nothing contained in this chapter shall
apply to sales or transfers of property by executors, administrators, receivers, or public
officers, acting under judicial process." See McRae v. Levy, 177 Wash. 332, 31 P.2d
1028 (1934).
34 Goetz v. Michael Tauber & Co., 282 F. 869 (7th Cir. 1922) ; Schwartz v. King
Realty & Inv. Co., 93 N.J.L. 111, 107 Atl. 154 (1919).
35 Peterson v. Doak, 43 Wash. 251, 86 Pac. 663 (1906). Cf. Daniels v. Pacific Brew-
ing & Malting Co., 86 Wash. 416, 150 Pac. 609 (1915).
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are returned to that creditor by the failing debtor.3" A common law
assignment by a failing debtor for the benefit of creditors is not a
sale within the meaning of the Bulk Sales Law," and the assignee
has been held not to be a purchaser within the meaning of the act."
The assignee, however, does take title in trust for the creditors and
any rights of such creditors are enforceable in an action at law against
said assignee. 9 It is not clear whether these rules are applicable to all
assignments for the benefit of creditors in Washington," or whether
as in the McAvoy case'1 they will be limited only to financially in-
secure or failing debtors. A chattel mortgage given on a stock of
goods for a bona fide debt apparently does not constitute a bulk sale
in Washington. 2 Although this is the general rule, at least one juris-
diction having a Bulk Sales Law similar to Washington's has held
differently."
EXTENT OF COVERAGE OF THE WASHINGTON BuLK SALES LAW
Types of subject matter covered. Fixtures and equipment as well
as stocks of goods, wares or merchandise fall under the scope of the
Bulk Sales Law. 4 Goods of any merchandising establishment, restau-
rant, beer parlor, tavern, hotel, club or gasoline service station are ex-
pressly included in the act." "Fixtures and equipment" include those
36 Globe Elec. Co. v. Montgomery, 85 Wash. 452, 148 Pac. 596 (1915) ; See Annot.,
59 A.L.R.2d 1115 (1958).37 McAvoy v. Jennings, 44 Wash. 79, 87 Pac. 53 (1906).
88 Kasper v. Spokane Merchants' Ass'n, 87 Wash. 447, 151 Pac. 800 (1915).
29 Norris v. Anderson, 134 Wash. 403, 235 Pac. 966 (1925).
40 Driscoll, The "Sales in Bulk" Act, 4 WASH. L. Rxv. 97 (1929). See also Note,
Preferential Transfers (Bulk Sales), 11 Sw. L. J. 369 (1957).
-1 "MeAvoy v. Jennings, supra note 37.
42 Daniels v. Pacific Brewing & Malting Co., 86 Wash. 416, 150 Pac. 609 (1915).
See Shattuck, Secured Transactions (Other Thai Real Estate Mortgages)-A Com-
parison of the Law in Washington and the Uniform Commercial Code, Article 9, 29
WASH. L. REv. 1, 21 (1954).
4 For example, see Texas Bank & Trust Co. v. Teich, 283 S.W. 552 (Tex. Civ. App.
1926). See also, Annot., 57 A.L.R. 1049 (1928).
44 RCW 63.08.010 states a sale in bulk includes transfer of: "the fixtures and equip-
ment used in and about the business of a vendor....!
4 RCW 63.08.010 includes as bulk sale the transfer of "all or substantially all of
any stock of goods, wares or merchandise, and/or all or substantially all of the fixtures
and equipment used in and about the business of a vendor engaged in the business of
buying and selling and dealing in goods, wares or merchandise, of any kind or descrip-
tion, or in the business of operating a restaurant, cafe, beer parlor, tavern, hotel, club
or gasoline service station. . ..
Goods of establishments that are included in the Bulk Sales Law are indicated in
part by the following cases: Hull v. Minkler, 51 Wn.2d 508, 319 P.2d 815 (1958)
(gasoline service station) ; Arnold v. King, 236 F.2d 877 (9th Cir. 1956) (egg grading
and processing plant) ; Norris v. Anderson, 134 Wash. 403, 235 Pac. 966 (1925)(grocery business) ; Eklund v. Hopkins, 36 Wash. 179, 78 Pac. 787 (1904) (second
hand store) ; Kohn v. Fishback, 36 Wash. 69, 78 Pac. 199 (1904) (retail liquor, cigars
and sundries); Fitz Henry v. Munter, 33 Wash. 629, 74 Pac. 1003 (1903) (dry goods
and notions). See also Annot, 168 A.L.R. 762 (1947).
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items used in and about the business that help the merchant to store,
handle, display and market his goods, and include store, warehouse
and office fixtures and equipment." Sale of an interest in a business
will constitute a bulk sale 7 if the business is one which comes within
the scope of the act. Sales of real property or intangibles have gen-
erally not been considered bulk sales, 8 unless included in the sale of
the business as a whole.
Type of business covered. During the early history of the Bulk
Sales Law, the courts were undecided as to what type of businesses
the law encompassed-whether it included only the retail mercantile
businesses, or a much broader category." The amendment in 1925
stressed that the vendor covered by the act was to be "engaged in the
business of buying and selling and dealing in goods, wares and mer-
chandise." 0 It is apparent that the act now is not intended to include
manufacturers, jobbers, canners, wholesalers and packers, but rather
is limited to mercantile businesses5" and those specific exceptions listed
in the act.5 The Bulk Sales Law, as any other statute, may be in-
corporated into a contract of sale of a business, even though that
business automatically does not fall within the purview of the act."
Types of transfer covered. To come within the scope of the statute,
there must be a transfer in bulk of all or substantially all of the bulk
46 Driscoll, supra note 23, at 107, 108.
47 RCW 63.08.010 defines a bulk sale also as being "the sale, exchange or transfer...
of substantially the entire business of buying, selling and dealing in goods, wares or
merchandise, or of operating a restaurant, cafe . . ." [Emphasis added]. See also
Hull v. Minkler, 51 Wn.2d 508, 319 P.2d 815 (1958) ; Arnold v. King, 236 F.2d 877
(9th Cir. 1956); Minder v. Gurley, 37 Wn.2d 123, 222 P.2d 185 (1950); Garner v.
Thompson, 161 Wash. 317, 296 Pac. 1043 (1931).
48 Farrel v. Paulus, 309 Mich. 441, 15 N.W.2d 700 (1944); Thorndike & Hix
Lobster Co. v. Hall, 132 Misc. 732, 230 N.Y.S. 554 (1928) ; Ventrilla v. Tortorice, 160
La. 516, 107 So. 390 (1926); Hall v. Conine, 230 S.W. 823 (Tex. Civ. App. 1921).
49 Everett Produce Co. v. Smith, 40 Wash. 566, 82 Pac. 905 (1905) (livery feed and
boarding stable not within the act) ; Plass v. Morgan, 36 Wash. 160, 78 Pac. 784 (1904)
(boarding house and restaurant within the act) ; McDaniels v. J. J. Connely Shoe Co.,
30 Wash. 549, 71 Pac. 37 (1902) (retail shoe business within the act).
50 Supra note 7.
51 Seattle Lodge No. 211, Loyal Order of Moose v. Par-T-Pak Beverage Co., 155
Wash. Dec. 649, 349 P.2d 229 (1960) (Bulk Sales Act not applicable to a sale of a
beverage manufacturing concern) ; Mill & Logging Supply Co. v. West Tenino Lumber
Co., 44 Wn.2d 102, 265 P.2d 807 (1954) (Bulk Sales Act not applicable to sale of
lumber mill). See also Annot. 41 A.L.R. 1214 (1926); 46 A.L.R. 982 (1927); 168
A.L.R. 735 (1947). But see Arnold v. King, 236 F.2d 877 (9th Cir. 1956) (business
purchased eggs from producers, and operated plant where eggs were candled and proc-
essed for sale; held, a business of buying and selling merchandise in the regular course
of business, and within the act).
52 RCW 63.08.010.
53 Seattle Lodge No. 211, Loyal Order of Moose v. Par-T-Pak Beverage Co., 155
W.ash. Dec. 649, 349 P.2d 229 (1960), where it was held that the parties can agree to
incorporate the Bulk Sales Law into the sale contract, even though the business
(bottling and manufacturing) normally would not be covered by the statute.
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seller's goods or fixtures. The difficulty arises in the determination
of what constitutes "substantially all" of the vendor's goods. Sale of
one-half interest in a business and the stock of goods may constitute
a bulk sale." Transfer of two thirds of restaurant personal property
has been held within the act.5" But sale of all the sheet music of a
music store which constituted only about seven percent of the value
of the entire stock was held not to be a bulk sale, even though such
transfer was the entire sheet music business of the vendor." Like-
wise, sale of approximately one-fourth of the goods of a small retail
store was held not to be governed by the sales in bulk act." The court
interprets "substantially all" as the effect upon the controlling interest
of the vendor in relation to the extent to which the creditor's position
is jeopardized, rather than "practically all" of the vendor's goods or
business." If the effect upon the vendor's control of the business is
substantial, there might be situations where something less than half
of the business interest or of the goods sold in bulk could be con-
sidered a "bulk sale" and thus within the requirements of the statute.
The determination of what constitutes a bulk sale made "out of the
usual and ordinary course of business"5 creates another problem. In
most instances, it is fairly obvious when a sale is not in the normal
business pattern of the vendor. But what of the instance where a
retail seller holds an "off season," "close-out?' or "obsolete" sale? What
if the vendor periodically holds such sales? The Washington court has
not yet been presented with these questions. In other jurisdictions,
it generally has been held that these are bulk sales and within the
scope of the statute. However,"0 at least one case has held such sales,
when an established operational pattern of the business, to be within
51 Spokane Merchants' Ass'n. v. Koska, 118 Wash. 445, 203 Pac. 169 (1922).55 Mindur v. Gurley, 37 Wn2d 123, 222 P2d 185 (1950).
56 Blanchard Co. v. Ward, 124 Wash. 204, 213 Pac. 929 (1923).5 7 Fudge v. Brown, 126 Wash. 475, 218 Pac. 251 (1923). In this case, the purchases
were $1,090.60 on one date and $487.34 two weeks later. The total value of the stock
of goods owned by the seller was in controversy, one party claiming the value as being
$20,000, and the other claiming the value as being only $6,000. Since it was admitted
that the sale was only a portion of the stock and not "substantially all," the court found
the sale not within the Bulk Sales Law.
58 Driscoll, mspra note 23, at 106, 107.
59 RCW 63.08.010.60Jubas v. Sampsell, 195 F.2d 333 (9th Cir. 1950), (obsolete shoe styles "sale"
held not within the ordinary course of business); Butler Bros. v. Sinkin, 129 Tex.
331, 104 S.W.2d 14 (1937) (sale of goods damaged by fire ("fire sale") held within
the Bulk Sales Act); Irving Trust Co. v. Rosenwasser, 5 F.Supp. 1016 (D.C.N.Y.
1934), ("close-out" shoe sale held not within the ordinary course of business, even
though seller periodically and regularly held such sales) ; Conquest v. Atkins, 123 Me.
327, 122 A. 858 (1933), (sale of broken lots of wallpaper held within the Bulk Sales
Law) ; Cohen v. Calhoun, 168 Miss. 34, 150 So. 198 (1933), (sale of 150 shopworn
dresses held within the Bulk Sales Law).
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the "ordinary course of business" of the vendor and hence not subject
to the terms of the Bulk Sales Law."' It would seem that the better
view would be to look to the facts of each individual case, rather than
categorically state that all such sales come within or without the stat-
ute. If the business periodically holds such sales to move out a block
of goods or merchandise for the purpose of making way for the new
stock, there is no reason for requiring compliance with the Bulk Sales
Law. However, since the primary purpose of the Bulk Sales Law is
for the protection of the creditor, perhaps the policy of such protec-
tion outweighs the disadvantage of inconvenience to buyer in such sales.
CREDITORS
Who is a creditor. Not everyone may avail himself of the pro-
tection of the Bulk Sales Law. In order to succeed in an action based
upon the statute, the plaintiff must show that he is a creditor within
the meaning of the act.62 In Hull v. Minkler, the court stated that a
person is a "creditor" within the meaning of RCW 63.08.020 when the
debt was incurred for the purpose of carrying on the business, if that
debt was incurred subsequent to the acquisition and prior to the dis-
position of the business.6" It is, therefore, the "business creditor" who
is protected. Included are only those creditors of the vendor who are
creditors because of indebtedness for goods, wares, merchandise, fix-
tures or equipment, services rendered to the vendor, or because of
money borrowed by the vendor to carry on his business.6'
It was once held that one who is a creditor because of personal
services rendered is not a creditor protected by the Bulk Sales Law."
Since that decision, the statute has been amended to include creditors
who render services to the vendor.66 Liability for rent cannot be based
upon the Bulk Sales Statute;6 the lessor of a display sign was held
61 Sternberg v. Rubenstein, 305 N.Y. 235, 112 N.E.2d 210 (1953). See also Annot.,
36 A.L.R.2d 1141 (1954).
62 Electrical Prods. Consol. v. Smyser, 19 Wn.2d 509, 143 P.2d 452 (1943) ; Hard-
wick v. Gettier, 43 Wash. 644, 86 Pac. 943 (1906).
63 Hull v. Minkler, 51 Wn.2d 508, 319 P.2d 815 (1958). See also Electrical Prods.
Consol. v. Smyser, 19 Wn.2d 509, 143 P.2d 452 (1943) ; Annot., 102 A.L.R. 565 (1936),
and Annot., 84 A.L.R. 1406 (1933).
64 Driscoll, supra note 23, at 108, 109.
65 McRae v. Levy, 177 Wash. 332, 31 P.2d 1028 (1934).
66 RCW 63.08.020 includes creditors within the statute as those "to whom the vendor
is indebted for or on account of services, commodities, goods, wares, or merchandise, or
fixtures and equipment.... [Emphasis added]. See Seattle Lodge No. 211, Loyal Order
of Moose v. Par-T-Pak Beverage Co., 155 Wash. Dec. 649, 349 P.2d 229 (1960), where
utilities (lights and water) were held to be "services" within the meaning of the statute.
67 Seattle Lodge No. 211, Loyal Order of Moose v. Par-T-Pak Beverage Co., supra
note 66.
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not to be a creditor of the lessee within the meaning of the statute."
A holder of individual notes of a partner is not a creditor of the part-
nership under the statute. 9 On the other hand, a vendor in a condi-
tional sales contract who has elected to stand on the contract and not
to retake the property has been held to be a creditor within the pro-
tection of the act.7" A consignor of goods may also be a protected
creditor.71 The sale must be a completed one, however. For example,
a person to whom an order for goods was given for future delivery
was held not to be a creditor, at least not until some of the goods had
been delivered.72
The creditor's remedies. The proper remedy for the creditor when
the parties fail to comply with the statute is garnishment or attach-
ment of the property, but where the goods cannot be reached because
of disposal or resale by the vendee, the creditor may sue the vendee
for the value of the goods without first pursuing the property itself."
As a condition precedent to recovery from the vendee, the creditor
must either obtain a judgment or at least commence action against the
vendor to establish the debt owed the creditor." It is not enough that
the affidavit of creditors be obtained from the vendor by the vendee; 75
it is the duty of the buyer to apply the purchase price pro rata to the
bona fide claims of the creditors."8 If the purchaser does not comply
68 Electrical Prods. Consol. v. Smyser, 19 Wn2d 509, 143 P.2d 452 (1943). This
case was decided under the law as amended in 1939. It is possible that the result would
be different under the 1943 amendment. The 1943 amendment includes creditors who
render services to the vendor as being within the protection of the act. See stpra note
10, and text pertaining thereto.69 Whitehouse v. Nelson, 43 Wash. 174, 86 Pac. 174 (1906). See also Garner v.
Thompson, 161 Wash. 317, 296 Pac. 1043 (1931), where it was held that only partner-
ship creditors need be listed on the affidavit of creditors, not the individual creditors of
each partner.70 Stewart & Holmes Drug Co. v. Reed, 74 Wash. 401, 133 Pac. 577 (1913).
71 McRae v. Levy, supra note 65.
72Hardwick v. Gettier, 43 Wash. 644, 86 Pac. 943 (1906).
73Minder v. Gurley, 37 Wn.2d 123, 222 P.2d 185 (1950) ; Friedman v. Branner, 72
Wash. 338, 130 Pac. 360 (1913).
74 Mill& Logging Supply Co. v. West Tenino Lumber Co., 44 Wn.2d 102, 265 P.2d
807 (1954).
7;The vendee has a duty to obtain the list of creditors, under the provisions of RCW
63.08.020. See Friedman v. Branner, 72 Wash. 338, 130 Pac. 360 (1913); Olwell v.
Gordon & Co., 40 Wash. 185, 82 Pac. 180 (1905) ; Fitz Henry v. Munter, 33 Wash. 629,
74 Pac. 1003 (1903) ; McDaniels v. J. J. Connelly Shoe Co., 30 Wash. 549, 71 Pac. 37(1902).76 RCW 63.08.050 states that as to creditors within the scope of the statute, the sale
will be fraudulent and void if the vendee fails to apply '... such purchase price first, to
the taxes with respect to the operation of the business of the vendor and without apply-
ing or causing to be applied the balance of such purchase price; secondly, pro rata to
the payment of the bona fide claims of the creditors of the vendor as shown upon the
statement...' See Rustuen v. Apro, 40 Wn.2d 395, 243 P.2d 479 (1952); Spokane
Merchants' Ass'n v. Koska, 118 Wash. 445, 203 Pac. 969 (1922).
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with the statute, he holds the goods he has obtained as a trustee for
the benefit of all creditors."
It is clear that the creditor has an adequate remedy when there is
a complete failure by the vendee to obtain a statement of creditors
from the vendor. What is the result where a statement is obtained
but there is an inadvertent omission of a creditor from the list? The
purchaser has complied with the statute to the fullest extent possible
under the circumstances. Does the omitted creditor have a claim
against the purchaser? May he treat the sale as being "fraudulent
and void"? Although no Washington case has passed upon these ques-
tions directly, it would seem from the statutory language that creditors
may treat the sale as void only upon failure to obtain a statement and
failure to apply the purchase price as directed by the statute." Thus,
if a seller honestly and inadvertently omits a creditor from his list,
such creditor should not be permitted to recover from the purchaser.
It could be argued that the purpose of the Bulk Sales Law (to pro-
tect the defrauded creditor) is defeated by this result. If the statute
is to be construed liberally in favor of creditors, the omitted creditor
should be able to treat the sale void as to him; 7 if there is a more
strict construction, the creditor who has been inadvertently omitted
from the list will not be allowed to follow the goods to the purchaser,
nor sue him directly for the value of the goods." On the other hand,
if the vendor knowingly omits a creditor from the sworn list, the ven-
dor is criminally liable for furnishing such false statement to the
buyer.8
"Void" or "voidable" sale as to creditors. If the procedure as
prescribed by the statute is not followed, RCW 63.08.050 provides
that the "sale or transfer shall be fraudulent and void as to creditors
of the vendor." [Emphasis added.] It should be noted that the sale
of the goods without compliance with the statute does not render the
transfer absolutely void. The Bulk Sales Law makes such transfer
7 Kohn v. Fishback, 36 Wash. 69, 78 Pac. 199 (1905).
78 RCW 63.08.050. The section is headed "Effect of failure to obtain statement."
The statute section requires three things to be done by the vendee: (1) Demand and
receive from the vendor the affidavit of creditors; (2) apply the purchase price first
to unpaid taxes and, secondly, pro rata to creditors listed upon the statement; (3) file
the statement in the office of the county auditor at least seven days prior to the con-
summation of the purchase.
79 Lindstrom v. Spicher, 53 N.D. 195, 205 N.W. 231 (1925) ; Oregon Mill & Grain
Co. v. Hyde, 87 Ore. 163, 169 Pac. 791 (1918).
80 Marcus v. Knitzer, 168 Misc. 9, 4 N.Y.S.2d 308 (1938) ; Highway Signs & Servic-
ing Co. v. Scott, 134 Kan. 658, 8 P.2d 391 (1932) ; McKelvey v. John Schaap & Sons
Drug Co., 143 Ark. 477, 220 S.W. 827 (1920); see also VOLD, SALES, § 81 (2d ed.
(1959).
81 Supra note 17.
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fraudulent only as to the creditors of the transferor. As between the
transferor and the transferee, the title does pass.82 RCW 63.08.050
specifically states that a bulk sale without compliance with the statute
(because of failure to obtain a statement of creditors from the ven-
dor) is fraudulent and void as to the creditors of the vendor. In Hull
v. Minkler, s the court construed the sale as being voidable, rather
than completely void. In that case, A, the owner, transferred an entire
gasoline station business to B, the transferee, without any considera-
tion for the transfer. B in turn transferred the property to the B-C
partnership. In neither transfer was there compliance with the Bulk
Sales Law. H, a business creditor of A, obtained a money judgment
against A. " H commenced this garnishment action against the B-C
partnership, based upon that judgment. The court found that the
second transfer clearly was within the purview of the Bulk Sales Law 5
and that the first transfer, even though it was without consideration,
was also within the scope of the statute. 6 The court further held that
since C, the partner and second transferee took the property of the
business without notice of the "voidable" nature of B's title, C stood
as a bona fide purchaser for value and as to H the creditor, C was not
personally liable.
It should be noted that H was allowed to satisfy his judgment out
of the partnership assets that could be traced after that second trans-
fer (the one from B to the B-C partnership) because the partnership
itself was not a bona fide purchaser. The court stated that the situa-
tion was analagous to that in which one partner obtains assets through
fraud while not acting within the scope of his employment. As long
as the assets are traceable, they are recoverable, but the partner
having no knowledge of the fraud is not personally liable.
In the Minkler case, the fact that there was a voidable title in the
hands of the first transferee suggests that good title could be passed
to a second bona fide purchaser for value.' The use of the word
82 Hull v. Minkler, 51 Wn2d 508, 319 P2d 815 (1958); Norris v. Anderson, 134
Wash. 403, 235 Pac. 966 (1925) ; Kasper v. Spokane Merchants' Ass'n., 87 Wash. 447,151 Pac. 800 (1915).
83 51 Wn2d 508, 319 P.2d 815 (1958).
84 The creditor must establish his debt by judgment or commencement of action
against the vendor; he cannot establish it initially in a direct action against the bulk
purchaser. Mill & Logging Supply Co. v. West Tenino Lumber Co., 44 Wn.2d 102,
265 P.2d 807 (1954).
85 See Minder v. Gurley, 37 Wn.2d 123, 222 P.2d 185 (1950).
86 See notes 24 through 29 supra, and text pertaining thereto.
87 Hull v. Minkler, supra note 84 at 516, 517. See also Kasper v. Spokane Mer-
chants' Ass'n., 87 Wash. 447, 151 Pac. 800 (1915).
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"voidable" by the court is in direct conflict with the statutory word
"void." It would seem that if the wording of the statute is literally
construed, i.e., construed in favor of the creditor,88 the first purchaser
could pass nothing to a bona fide purchaser for value, since as to the
creditor the original transfer would be absolutely void and a nullity.
This result would make any subsequent sale of the merchandise, how-
ever remote, ineffective as against the creditor of the original vendor.
The court apparently felt that such was not the legislative intent when
the Bulk Sales Law was enacted.8" By making the distinction between
the case of a single transfer by the vendor and that of a resale by the
vendee to a subsequent purchaser in good faith and without notice of
outstanding creditors, the Washington court has indicated that bona
fide "sub-purchasers" for value will take good title, regardless of the
wording of the statute. This is in accord with the majority of other
jurisdictions."
CONCLUSION
The Bulk Sales Law in Washington has generally achieved its de-
sired effect, namely, the protection of creditors from the defrauding
seller. The various amendments to the act since its inception point
out to a significant degree the technical changes in the scope of the
statute without a substantial difference in the purpose. Ambiguities
have been minimized, but not eliminated. In every bulk sale of goods
or transfer of a business interest, the practicing attorney should be
aware of the impact of the statute and be cognizant of its application.
Lack of such awareness may result in a financially embarrassing situ-
ation for the client, whether he is a creditor, buyer or seller. Follow-
ing the bulk sale statutory procedure carefully, step by step, will
avoid the possibility of a defective sale or transfer.
P. BRUCE WILSON
88 Construing the statute as a whole in favor of the creditor is considered a "liberal"
construction of the Bulk Sales Law. VOLD, SALES § 81 (2d ed. 1959). See notes 20, 21
supra.
89 Kasper v. Spokane Merchants' Ass'n., 87 Wash. 447, 151 Pac. 800 (1915).
90 For example, see: Grove Mfg. Co. v. Salter, 26 Ga. App. 369, 106 S.E. 208 (1921);
McKelvey v. John Schaap & Sons Drug Co., 143 Ark. 477, 220 S.W. 827 (1920);
Prokopovitz v. Chimka, 170 Wis. 190, 174 N.W. 448 (1919); Kelly-Buckley Co. v.
Cohen, 195 Mass. 585, 81 N.E. 297 (1907). See also VOLD, SALES, § 81 (2d ed. 1959).
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